The motivation for this timely book is renewed Russian aggression in Europe. Post Cold War stability has been severely shaken up following the invasion of Ukraine. Various countries formerly within the Soviet sphere are asking themselves, “Who will be in Putin’s sights next?” Formerly neutral nations – Finland and Sweden – have abandoned neutrality and joined NATO, despite Russian warnings, in search of security: but Donald Trump’s blinkered America First rhetoric has left them wondering whether they made the right choice. It was shocking to see all the various actions of Russian sabotage, harassment and surveillance listed together in one volume. Moody leaves us in no doubt that Russian hostility, only just below the level of open warfare, always testing and probing for vulnerabilities, is the reality of European political life.
Oliver Moody is a journalist who has worked for The Times in Northern Europe since 2018 and is a thoughtful contributor to The Times Literary Supplement. As well as seeking a strategic overview of the situation in the Baltic region, he is concerned to introduce us to some its lesser known nations, particularly the frontline states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They, together with Finland and Poland, will be first up in any Ukraine-style assault on Western Europe. Do they have the resolve and the resources to make Putin think twice? And what sort of support might they receive from other European powers?
I had a personal motivation for choosing this book. I am married to a Finn and frequently travel there to meet up with friends and family. I know firsthand how Finns reacted to the Ukraine war and to America’s recent anti-Europe stance. Having declared independence from revolutionary Russia in 1917, and fought a war of survival against them in 1939, and having Europe’s longest land border with them, Finland is seriously worried about the ambitions of their long term enemy.
I have also been to Tallin via a ferry from Helsinki, shortly after Estonia’s exit from the Soviet empire. There I witnessed for myself the economic devastation visited on the country by their former masters. I wasn’t there very long, but the sight of a grandmother standing by the side of the road, trying to sell a couple of chipped teacups to be able to get a bit of bread for her family, has stuck with me. I also witnessed the sense of kinship with Finland, whose businesses were investing heavily in the country and already helping to bring about the Estonian resurgence so manifest today.
I certainly learned a lot about Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (“the Baltic states”) from Baltic – as Moody rightly supposes, like most English speakers I have just about heard of them but have little further knowledge. There are potted descriptions of their pre- and post-Soviet histories, literature, national myths, musical traditions and other cultural strata, leading to an assessment of their resilience, particularly in terms of the strength of their sense of identity as peoples who have been subjected to russification and are determined never ever to go back there again.
Baltic expects that the nations in the region will have national psyches that are reflected in their legends and cultures and are played out in their political and strategic aspirations. Estonia’s “Singing Revolution” is a great case in point: that country’s powerful choral traditions led its people to gather and sing as an act of resistance that helped to break Russian rule.
Nonetheless Moody’s assessment has a rather nineteenth century feel to it, reminiscent of all those people who went about collecting folk songs, collating local tales into national epics whose episodes were then interpreted by leading artists of the day, championing their languages against those that had cultural ascendancy over them, and generally cultivating the late Romantic nationalisms that united some nations – Italy, Germany – and are still creating subdivisions in others – Basque and Irish separatism and the break up of Yugoslavia, among others. Finland is a great example: the bringing together of various folk tale fragments into the Kalevala, which were then iconised in music and paint by Jean Sibelius and Axeli Gallen-Kallela, challenged both Russian political and Swedish cultural hegemonies and made the Finns ready to seize their own destiny in 1917.
This ferment undoubtedly brewed up negative as well as positive cultural effects. Arguably imperialism, colonialism, the first world war, and fascism are all dreams of romantic nationalism which soured into nightmares. An increasingly sceptical Europe turned from its Christian roots and made idols of its nations, which ended up, in the way of idolatries, devouring their children…
So is Moody right to look to a strong sense of national identity as the best way to repel Russian domination? He certainly does justice to the complexity of the issues in the Baltic states. After Stalinist russification Estonia was nearly 50% Russophone, so a key aim of the newly liberated nation was to suppress that alien culture, phasing out the teaching of Russian in schools, and closing down Russophile political parties and media. It’s very telling that although many people of Russian heritage are unhappy with these changes, none of them are so unhappy that they choose to return eastwards.
But it’s also troubling for readers in a UK context, where the great aim seems to be to downplay ethnic and cultural difference so that we can all get along. Does this mean we are effete westerners who no longer have enough sense of our cultural and historical identity to resist 21st century aggressors and oppressors? Is cultural homogeneity too high a price to pay for national resilience? Do we need to become politically and culturally more conservative to withstand Russian ambition, and perhaps add to the growing list of “strong men” playing at identity politics among contemporary world leaders? Let’s hope not – but Baltic might have benefitted from further interrogation of these underlying issues.
What is apparent is Moody’s admiration for these small but tough and determined states. They are facing up to the challenges of Russian expansion and preparing to make Putin regret invading them if it comes to that. Having experience of Finnish “sisu” I get the attitude. They gave the Soviets a bloody nose in 1939 and if forced to are prepared to do it again: they have universal military service, up to date equipment and enough bunkers to shelter every single one of their 5 million population. Did you see the recent Scandinavia series on the BBC? It’s clear that Simon Reeves shares Moody’s admiration.
However facing down the overwhelming domination of Russia in arms and manpower will require some measure of unity among resisting countries. Moody evaluates the will to resist in each of the other states in the region, with varying results. Shakiest in his view is Germany, sadly enough as they are the largest West European nation in terms of population and economy. He sees them as still attached to the Ostpolitik of a now vanished era, hankering after the benefits of rapprochement with Russia in terms of trade and energy supply, and too ashamed of past militarism to convey deterrence in our period of heightened tensions. The description of shortages among German forces was both laughable and excruciating. There are signs that attitudes are changing and resources are being redirected: the question is, will it be too little, too late?
There are gaps. Sweden has recently joined NATO, like Finland, an example of Russian aggression producing the opposite rather than the desired effect, a strengthening rather than weakening of NATO. There was hardly any analysis of this, of how the Swedish people currently feel about, or of the history and culture of Sweden, even though they are a much larger player than most of the others. There is a direct history of Swedish and Russian confrontation, for example Charles V’s invasion of Russia (Poltova, where he was finally defeated, is in Ukraine). Sweden built castles across their then domains in Finland to keep the Russians out. Napoleon finally wrested the Grand Duchy of Finland from the Swedes and gifted it to the Czar, with whom he was temporarily allied, leading to a century of Russian rule.
An even bigger omission is some sort of handle on Russian motivation. Yes it is clear that Russia under Putin is deeply antagonistic towards the rest of Europe – but why? Is it the age old fear of invasion from the West, following in the footsteps of Charles V, Napoleon and Hitler? Is it the constriction of geography? Russia’s only maritime outlets are via the Black Sea and the Baltic, both leading to narrow straits firmly in the control of NATO member states. Or is it just the remembrance of past glories? Is it even that rather 19th century romantic nationalism with Russia as the state destined to rule the world? Sadly this is the odious view of Patriarch Kirill, leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, who has backed the unprovoked onslaught upon Ukraine, and clearly identifies these massacres as the will of Jesus Christ. Or is Kirill perhaps simply too aware of what would happen to him if he didn’t support his master, who is not Jesus but Putin? We don’t know, but if we did we might be able to counter the poison. There are more economic, spiritual and cultural prosperities available to Russia as a participant with the West than as a foe. Why can’t they see them?
Some conclusions:
• Baltic leaves us in no doubt that Russia is a hostile actor towards Western Europe that demands a firm and determined response.
• Little states such as the Baltics are not fazed by this and in spite of their small size are confident that they can be tough enough to give Putin pause for thought.
• Europe has cultures and traditions, sadly often obliterated in the case of the UK, which are worth cherishing and should not be given up to the oblivion of Russification.
• Strategically the first step Putin will take is likely to be in the Baltic. This is the impetus behind the multiple incidents of sabotage and surveillance in the area. From a Russian point of view this aggressive campaign has had the negative effect of drawing attention to their strategy. The Baltic Sea must therefore be sealed off immediately in the event of any Russian military incursion. It sounds as though Finland and Estonia are already taking steps in the setting up of anti-ship missile batteries on both sides of the Gulf of Finland.
• It’s getting late to respond adequately but it is not too late! The region is revising its priorities, reallocating its resources and is on the road to readiness.
• It’s all a double edged sword for Ukraine though. I don’t see how Russia could even consider an assault anywhere else as long as they are bogged down in Ukraine. But if peace were to be achieved in Ukraine, as we all long for it to be, that would free Russia to pursue its ambitions elsewhere…
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